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This paper explores the relationship between sentencing guidelines
and prison populations in nine states. The guidelines are associated
with declines in prison population growth in the six states where legisla-
tors decreed that guideline framers consider prison capacity when estab-
lishing guidelines for prison sentence lengths. In some states the
guideline laws alone appear to have caused prison population growth to
moderate, but in others the guidelines were probably only one aspect of
a larger policy to limit prison expansion.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant trends in criminal justice is the grow-
ing emphasis on imprisonment. Legislators have continuously re-
sponded to constituent fears by establishing longer sentences or
mandatory minimum sentences for wide varieties of crimes and
criminals.1 As a result, United States prison populations have in-
creased nearly 400% in the twenty-five years from 1968 to 1993.2
* This article was prepared under Grant No. 88-IJ-CX-0045 from the National Institute
ofJustice, United States Department ofJustice. Points of view or opinions are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department ofJustice.
** Director, Justec Research, Box 3002, Williamsburg, Virginia 23187. J.D., University
of Michigan, 1964; PhD., Sociology, University of Michigan, 1976. The data used in this
article are available from the author in ASCII format.
1 See, e.g., Patrick A. Langan, America's Soaring Prison Population, 251 Sci. 1568, passim
(1991).
2 Prison population data for 1968 and 1993 are not strictly comparable, but fairly good
estimates of growth are possible. In 1968 there were 187,274 inmates in federal or state
prisons sentenced to six months or more. STEPHANIE MINOR-HARPER, BuREAu OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1925-85, at 2-3 (1986). The latest, but
still preliminary, figure for the number of federal and state prisoners at the end of 1993 is
946,946; the number sentenced to more than one year is 910,080 (data obtained from the
Bureau ofJustice Statistics, 29 November 1994). The average of these two figures is 396%
higher than the 1968 figure. This may slightly exaggerate the growth because the 1993
figures, but not the 1968 figures, include prisoners in jail due to prison overcrowding. The
1993 figures include roughly 20,000 such jail inmates. See DARRELL K. GiLLuIAD & ALLENJ.
BECK, BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BuLLETIN, PRISONERS IN 1993, at 5 (1994).
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Sentencing guidelines have emerged as important moderating in-
fluences on this trend. Although their original purpose was to reduce
sentencing disparity, the guidelines have acquired a second function
in several states: to limit prison population growth by tailoring
sentences to prison capacity. Legislators who either worried about
prison costs or were not persuaded that more imprisonment effec-
tively reduced crime required the guideline authors to consider
prison capacity.3
Presumptive sentencing guidelines are sentence ranges based
mainly on the severity of the crime and the defendant's criminal his-
tory. The trial judge must either impose a sentence within the range
or give written reasons for departing from it.4 By 1990 (the cut-off
date for laws evaluated in this article), nine states had statewide pre-
sumptive sentencing guidelines. They are: Delaware (effective 10 Oc-
tober 1987), Florida (effective 1 October 1983), Michigan (effective 1
March 1984), Minnesota (effective 1 May 1980), Oregon (effective 1
November 1989), Pennsylvania (effective 22July 1982), Tennessee (ef-
fective 1 November 1989), Washington (effective 1 July 1984), and
Wisconsin (effective 1 November 1985).-
The initial step towards creating sentencing guidelines occurred
when state legislatures (in Michigan, the Supreme Court) created a
sentencing commission. 6 The commission drafted guidelines, and in
six states those guidelines could go into effect without legislative ap-
3 Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58
U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 934-37 (1991); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Les-
sons for State and Federal Refomers, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 123, 124 (1993); Michael H.
Tonry, The Politics and Processes of Sentencing Commissions, 37 CRiME & DEUNQ. 307, 311, 323-
24 (1991). See also infra text accompanying notes 9 to 15.
4 MICHAEL H. ToNRY, SENTENCING REFORM IMPACrS 102 (1987).
5 Supreme Court of Delaware, Directive Number Seventy-Six, September 15, 1987; In
reRules of Crim. Procedure, 439 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1983) (per curiam) (adopting Rule 3.701
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure); Michigan Supreme Court, Administrative Or-
der No. 1984-1, Sentencing Guidelines, January 17, 1984 (418 Mich. lxxx [1984]); 1978
Minn. Laws 723 § 20 (codified as MINN. STAT. § 244.01 (1978)); OR. REv. STAT. § 137.120
(1990); 204 PA. CODE § 303 (1982) (reprinted following 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721
(1982)); TENN. CODE AmN. § 40-35-117 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.905 (West
1988); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 973.012 (West 1985).
At least five states adopted mandatory guidelines after 1990: Arkansas, AmK. CODE
ANN. § 16-90-803 (Michie Supp. 1993) (effectiveJanuary 1, 1994); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 74-9101 (Supp. 1994) (effective July 1, 1993); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:322
(West Supp. 1994) (effective January 1, 1992); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.10 (Supp. 1994) (effectiveJanuary 1, 1995); and Virginia, January 1, 1991 (VIRGINIA
STATE OF THEJuDiciARY REPORT 1990, at A16 (1991)).
6 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6580 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.001 (West 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 244.09 (West 1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 137.663 (Supp. 1992); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2151 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-37-102 (1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.040 (West 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.01 (West 1985).
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proval.7 According to Professor Albert Alschuler, this procedure al-
lows the non-elective commissions to serve as buffers, allowing
legislators to avoid public clamor for stiffer sentences.8
Enabling legislation in six of the nine states charged sentencing
commissions, directly in five states and indirectly in one, to consider
prison capacity when drafting guidelines. The law creating the Min-
nesota sentencing commission states: "In establishing the sentencing
guidelines, the commission shall take into substantial consideration
current sentencing and release practices and correctional resources,
including but not limited to the capacities of local and state correc-
tional facilities."9 The Florida law contains virtually the same lan-
guage: "In establishing the sentencing guidelines, the commission
shall take into substantial consideration current sentencing and re-
lease practices and correctional resources, including but not limited
to the capacities of local and state correctional facilities." 10 In Wash-
ington, if the commission recommended guidelines that probably
would result in a prison population above capacity, it had to submit to
the legislature a second set of guidelines consistent with capacity;1 in
practice, however, the commission's initial recommendation was con-
sistent with capacity. 12 The Tennessee legislature directed its commis-
sion to formulate guidelines "consistent with . . . a prison capacity
figure arrived at by taking ninety-five percent (95%) of the present
constitutional capacity of the prison system and adding any new
7 The initial legislation stated that the sentencing commissions' guidelines went into
effect unless disapproved by the legislature in Florida, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Wis-
consin. FLA. STAT. ch. 921.001 (1985) (established by Supreme Court rule); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 244.09 (West 1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2151 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 973.012 (West 1985) and In re Judicial Admin. Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 353
N.W.2d 793 (Wis. 1984). In Pennsylvania the legislature rejected the commission's first
guideline proposal. See Susan E. Martin, Interests and Politics in Sentencing Reform: The Devel-
opment of Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota and Pennsylvania, 29 Viii. L. REv. 21, 67, 74
(1984). The Delaware guidelines went into effect when the state supreme court accepted
them. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6580 (1987). The Michigan guidelines were adopted by
the Supreme Court without legislative involvement.
The guidelines did not go into effect until specifically approved by the legislature in
the remaining three states, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington. 1987 Or. Laws 619;
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-37-203-205 (1990); 1981 Wash. Laws 137 § 7.
8 Alschuler, supra note 3, at 934-35. Alschuler likened it to the lawmakers' charging
the sentencing commission: "Stop us before we kill again." Id.
9 MuNN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 (West 1992) (prior to 1989 amendment).
10 F. A. STAT. ANN. § 921.001 (West 1985). The original law creating the sentencing
commission did not mention prison capacity, 1982 Fla. Laws ch. 145, but was quickly
amended to include it. 1983 Fla. Laws ch. 87.
11 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.040 (West 1988).
12 David Boerner, The Role of the Legislature in Guidelines Sentencing in "the Other Washing-
ton", 28 WAxE FoREsr L. REv. 381, 387-91 (1993).
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prison beds constructed.... ." The Oregon commission had to "take
into consideration... the effective capacity of state and local correc-
tions facilities,"' 4 and limiting prison population growth was probably
the most important reason for creating sentencing guidelines in that
state.15 Finally, the Delaware legislation, although not mentioning
prison capacity specifically, directed the commission to give "due re-
gard for resources availability and cost " 16 Presumably, resources avail-
ability includes prison capacity.
Three of the nine states did not include prison capacity among
the criteria. The Pennsylvania legislature considered such a provision,
but decided not to include it, and the sentencing commission did not
factor in prison capacity.' 7 In fact, the lawmakers rejected the com-
mission's initial proposal (even though it would have increased prison
populations substantially); instead, the guidelines became law only af-
ter the commission further toughened sentences.' 8 The charge to the
Michigan sentencing commission concerned only sentencing fair-
ness.' 9 The Wisconsin sentencing commission law does not mention
prison capacity,20 although controlling prison population growth later
become part of the commission's efforts.2 '
Descriptions of the guideline development process suggest that
13 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-37-203 (1990).
14 1987 Or. Laws 619.
15 Kathleen M. Bogan, Constructing Felony Sentencing Guidelines in an Already Crowded
State: Oregon Breaks New Ground, 36 CiusE & DEUiNQ. 467, 469-70 (1990).
16 DEL. CODE Am. tit. 11, § 6580 (1987).
17 1942 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2151-55 (1981); John H. Kramer et al., Sentencing
Guidelines: A Quantitative Comparison of Sentencing Policies in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and
Washington, 6Jusr. Q. 565, 570-71 (1989); Martin, supra note 7, at 67, 74 (1984).
18 Martin, supra note 7, at 88-99.
19 James A. McComb, An Overview of the Second Edition of the Michigan Sentencing Guide-
lines, 67 MICH. BJ. 863 (1988). The Michigan commission has never considered prison
capacity when developing or modifying its guidelines, and proposed legislation calling for
it to do so did not pass. Interview with James A. McComb, Michigan State Court Adminis-
trative Office (November 30, 1994).
As for the guidelines taking effect after 1990, the Kansas law contains language similar
to that in Minnesota, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101 (Supp. 1994), and the North Carolina law
is similar to the Washington law. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 164-42(d) (Supp. 1994). The Louisi-
ana law does not mention prison capacity. IA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:321-15:329 (West
Supp. 1994). The Arkansas commission was directed to limit prison sentences to the most
severe crimes and criminals because of the "finite capacity" of state prisons. Amx. CODE
ANN. § 16-90-801 (Michie Supp. 1993).
20 1983 Wis. Laws 371.
21 Sandra Shane-DuBow, Hybrid Guidelines: The Wisconsin Experience, 3 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 162 (1993). The Commission has not been a leader in efforts to control prison popu-
lation growth, but it worked with the Department of Corrections and the legislature when
they developed intensive supervision programs, and the Commission incorporated them
into the guidelines. Interview with Sandra Shane-DuBow, Executive Director, Wisconsin
Sentencing Commission (November 30, 1994). See infra note 47.
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the commissions generally followed legislative mandates to consider
prison capacity when formulating guidelines, especially by limiting im-
prisonment for non-violent crimes, although they sometimes made
corresponding increases for violent crimes.2 2 Thus, the question for
the present study is whether these legislative directives have effectively
moderated prison population growth.23
Commentators differ on the issue of whether guidelines actually
affected prison population growth. Washington and Minnesota
prison populations flattened out for several years after those states ini-
tiated guidelines, while nationwide figures continued to grow. Profes-
sors Tonry and Alschuler considered these laws successes in this
respect, but Alschuler questioned whether this effect is typical of
other guideline states.24 In contrast, Joachim Savelsberg faults the
Minnesota guideline commission for failing to realize its goal of keep-
ing prison population below capacity,2 5 and David Boerner concluded
that the guidelines might not have the effect assumed earlier after
discovering that Washington increased prison populations by more
than fifty percent in 1990-92.26 Most commentators generally view the
Florida guidelines as failures in most respects, including their inability
to hold prison population in check.27
II. RESEARCH DESIGN
This study estimates the impact of sentencing guidelines on pris-
ons by employing the multiple time series design, which many con-
sider the best procedure for evaluating state laws when a random
experiment is not feasible.28 The multiple time series design com-
22 Boerner, supra note 12, at 391; Bogan, supra note 15, at 484; Tonry, supra note 3, at
323-24.
23 In spite of the intended restraints, legislators in the guideline states continued to
stiffen penalties for repeat offenders and for some crimes, especially burglary and drug
offenses. See, e.g., Boerner, supra note 12, at 392-412; N. Gary Holten & Roger Handberg,
Florida's Sentencing Guidelines Surviving But Just Barely, 73 JuDicATuRE 259, 263-65 (1990);
Richard Lawrence, The Impact of Sentencing Guidelines on Corrections, 5 C~mM.Jusr. POL'v REv.
207, 208 (1991). Such changes were common elsewhere, of course, and as von Hirsch and
Greene note, the impact of sentencing guidelines on prison populations depends on
whether the punitive laws in guideline states have been less drastic than elsewhere. An-
drew von Hirsch &Judith Green, When Should Reformers Support Creation of Sentencing Guide-
lines? 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 329, 334, 341 (1993).
24 Alschuler, supra note 3, at 934-35; Tonry, supra note 3, at 311-12.
25 Joachim Savelsberg, Law That Does Not Fit Society: Sentencing Guidelines as Neoclassical
Reaction to the Dilemmas of Substantivized Law, 97 AM.J. Soc. 1346, 1373 (1992).
26 Boerner, supra note 12, at 382-84.
27 E.g., Holten & Handberg, supra note 23, at 267.
28 See e.g., DONALD CAMPBELL &JaMEs STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 55-57 (1967); Richard A. Berk et al., Estimation Procedures for Pooled
Cross-Sectional and Time Series Data, 3 EVALUATION Q. 385, passim (1979); Richard Lempert,
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bines data from all states over nearly two decades. Dependent vari-
ables in the regressions are prison admissions and population in each
state, and the independent variables include dummy variables repre-
senting the sentencing guidelines laws.29 Among other benefits, the
multiple time series design provides a large number of degrees of
freedom, controls for the analysis of individual state law, and facili-
tates the use of control variables.3 0
The standard regression procedure for multiple time series data
is the Fixed Effects Model.3 ' Its main feature is the inclusion of
dummy variables for each state and each year, which control for over-
all state differences in the dependent variables and for nationwide
yearly changes. They control for variables not entered in the analysis
to the extent that the latter move the mean for a particular state or
year from the overall mean. The year and state dummy variables are
highly significant in all regressions, without them the estimates of the
other variables would be biased.32
III. VARIABLES
A. SENTENCING GUIDELINE LAWS
The sentencing guidelines studied in this article are the nine pre-
sumptive guidelines that went into effect by 19 9 0-e.g., in Delaware,
Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Washington, and Wisconsin.33 Voluntary guidelines, which do not re-
Strategies of Research Design in the Legal Impact Study: The Control of Plausible Rival Hypotheses, 1
LAw & Soc. REv. 111, 130-31 (1966).
29 Each regression equation has one dependent variable (on the left side of the equa-
tion) and several independent variables (on the right side). The regression estimates the
impact of the independent variables (the guideline law dummy variables and the control
variables) on the dependent variable. The two dependent variables, prison population and
court commitments, are used in separate regression (see Table 1, infra at Appendix A).
The data are described infra at notes 33 to 40.
30 See supra note 28.
31 CHENG HsiAo, ANALYSIS OF PANEL DATA 41-48 (1986); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL
L. RUBINFELD, ECONoMETRIc MODELS AND ECONOMIC FoREcAsrs 224-26 (1991); Yair Mun-
dlak, On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data, 46 ECONOMETmIcA 69, passim (1978).
The following description of the fixed effects model is also based on these authorities.
32 Continuous variables are expressed as natural logs to moderate the impact of outliers
(logs make extreme values proportionally less extreme than otherwise). They are divided
by population to moderate the impact of the largest states (the year to year changes in, for
example, prison population are much greater in large states because a given percent
change involves more inmates than in small states; this greater variability means that the
results would be dominated by larger states if no adjustments were made). Autocorrelation
is corrected by applying separate first-order serial correlation coefficients for each state.
PnmDYCK & RUBI-FELD, supra note 31, at 228-29. Heteroscedasticity is corrected by weight-
ing regressions by the square root of population. See id. at 140-52.
33 Not enough time has passed to permit evaluation of later laws, including those in
Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Virginia. See supra note 5.
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quire judges to state reasons for departing from the guidelines, are
excluded because they are generally local and largely ignored by the
judges.34
Each sentencing guideline in the regression analyses is repre-
sented by a dummy variable: the variable is equal to zero before the
guidelines went into effect and for all other states; it is equal to one in
years after the law for the state in question; and in the initial year of
the guidelines, it is the portion of the year remaining after the effec-
tive date.
The variable is lagged one year when the guidelines apply only to
crimes committed after their effective dates, because considerable
time passes between the commission of a crime and sentencing. 35
The Delaware, Michigan, Tennessee, and Wisconsin guidelines, how-
ever, apply to sentences imposed on or after their effective dates, 6
and the law variables are not lagged because they apply immediately.
B. PRISON VARIABLES
The dependent variables37 are prison population and court com-
mitments to prison. Prison population is the number of prisoners
sentenced to state institutions for more than one year, for which year-
end data are available for 1976 through 1993 from the Bureau ofJus-
tice Statistics.5 8 Data for court commitments to prisons are available
34 Michael H. Tonry, Structuring Sentencing, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REvEW OF RE-
SEARCH 267, 276-82 (Michael H. Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1988); Deborah M. Carrow,
Judicial Sentencing Guidelines: Hazards of the Middle Ground, 68 JUDICATURE 161, passim
(1984); William D. Rich et al., Sentencing by Mathematics, 6 ST. OT.J. 33, passim (1982).
35 The mean time from arrest to sentencing is about seven months. RiCHARD SOLARI,
BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, NATiONALJUDIC A. REPORTING PROGRAM, 1988, at 45 (1992).
56 For the sources of effective dates, see supra note 3.
37 For definitions of dependent and independent variables, see supra note 27.
38 The prison data are from TRAcy L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CoRuncG-
TIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991, at 52 (1993), and similar reports for
earlier years. The statistics for 1992 and 1993 are unpublished and were obtained from the
Bureau ofJustice Statistics. The Bureau regularly revises prison population data, and the
data used are the latest revisions made through November 1994. The Bureau, however,
has not made the final revisions to the 1993 data. The Bureau also published state prison
population data for 1971-1975, but it changed counting procedures in 1977 (retroactive to
1976 for nearly all states) from the number of prison inmates to the number under prison
jurisdiction (the latter differs mainly in that it includes prisoners sentenced to prison but
placed in jail due to overcrowding).
The Oregon statistics include prisoners sentenced for less than one year. Before 1992
the state reported all prisoners as having sentences of more than one year, but starting in
1992 it reported about a quarter as having sentences of one year or less. DARRELL K. GIL-
LIARD, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 1992, at 2 (1992). Thus, the
data that Oregon supplied to the Bureau for prisoners sentenced to over one year make it
appear that the guidelines (which applied to crimes committed on or after 1 November
1979) were followed by a much larger decline in prison population than actually occurred.
The data used here include inmates sentenced to prison but placed in local jails due
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from 1974 through 1993.39
C. CONTROL VARIABLES
The multiple time series design allows for a large number of con-
trol variables, especially because the sample size is very large when
compared to that of other time-series analyses. Again, the most im-
portant control variables are the state and.year dummies, which con-
trol for unknown factors that affect the dependent variable in
individual states and individual years. Other control variables are the
percent in age groups associated with high imprisonment rates (18 to
24 years and 25 to 34 years) and two economic variables (per capita
personal income and employment rate).40 Finally, the major crime
rate (total crime less larceny and motor vehicle theft) for the prior
year is added to the analysis of prison commitments.4'
IV. REGRFSSION RESULTS4 2
The regression results with respect to prison population suggest
that the guidelines are strongly associated with slower growth of
prison populations. Six of the nine guideline laws studied-those in
Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington-
have significant negative coefficients, 43 which means that prison
to prison overcrowding. When data for such jailed prisoners are not available, the observa-
tion is scored as missing data (unless there is strong evidence that the number is less than
five percent of the total). Eight of the observations are missing data, mainly in 1976.
39 See SNELL, supra note 38, at 63. Earlier data are from similar reports for prior years.
The 1992 and 1993 data, obtained from the Bureau ofJustice Statistics, are unpublished.
Observations are scored as missing data when some prisoners are in localjails due to over-
crowding and thus not counted as prison commitments. This eliminates Tennessee from
the analysis.
40 The population data were obtained on computer disk from the United States Bureau
of the Census. The employment and personal income data were obtained on computer
disk from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Commerce. These
variables were selected because they are often thought to be associated with crime rates,
because adequate data are available, and because they differ sufficiently from year to year
and state to state such that they are not collinear with the state and year dummies. Note
that the analysis was not designed to estimate the impact of the control variables on prison
variables. There coefficients in Table 1 can be misleading due to possible collinearity be-
tween control variables and to general trends common to the control variables and the
dependent variable.
41 The crime data are from FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVFSTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1992, at 60-67 (1993) and from similar reports for
earlier years. Crime was not entered as a control variable in the prison population analysis
because the evidence is that it has little or no impact on prison population trends, but that
the latter affect crime, which leads to simultaneity problems. Langan, supra note 1, at
1570-72; Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Prison Population Growth and Crime Reduc-
tion, 10J. QUANTrTATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 109, 129-36 (1994).
42 Results are contained in Tables 1 and 2, infra at Appendix A.
43 The usual test for significance, significant at the .05 level or lower, means the results
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populations tend, to decline after the guidelines, at least in relation to
nation-wide trends. These are precisely the six states where legisla-
tures directed sentencing commissions to take prison capacity into
account.
As for the remaining three states, the coefficient for the Wiscon-
sin guidelines is nearly significant. The coefficient is far from signifi-
cant in Michigan, and it is significant and positive in Pennsylvania.44
The multiple time series regression suggests that the apparent im-
pact of sentencing guidelines is substantial. Because the prison popu-
lation variable is logged, the coefficients of the law variables estimate
the portion of change in prison population associated with the law.
Thus, prison populations are approximately fifteen to thirty-five per-
cent fewer than would be expected in the six states where the legisla-
tures directed that guidelines take prison capacity into account 45
The right-hand columns of Table 1 suggest that the sentencing
guidelines have little impact on the number of defendants sentenced
to prison. None of the coefficients are significant to the .05 level,
although the Delaware and Oregon guidelines are associated with
sizeable declines significant at the .10 level. The implication is that
changes in prison population growth are due mainly to changes in
prison term length.
V. DiSCUSSION
The results in Table 1 dearly indicate that legislative directives to
consider prison capacity are associated with moderation in prison
population growth. All states with this directive show this association,
and none of those without the directive show it (with the possible ex-
ception of Wisconsin) .46
The associations shown in Table 1 may be spurious, however, and
for three reasons the results do not necessarily mean that guidelines
are likely to occur by chance in five times or less in a hundred analyses.
An analysis similar to that in Table 1, using prison population data for 1971 to 1993
(that is including the less accurate data for 1971 to 1975), produced results similar to those
in Table 1 except that the coefficient on the Delaware law is not significant and the one on
the Wisconsin law is significant.
44 The fact that Pennsylvania guidelines are associated with unusual growth is consis-
tent with the legislative history. The legislature rejected the initial guidelines because it
did not consider the sentences sufficiently severe. See supra notes 14 to 15.
45 These estimates are net estimates of the impacts of the control variables. The year
dummies control for nationwide growth in prison populations, such that the estimates are
in part the differences between nationwide trends and trends in the guideline states. That
is, prison populations did not decline in those states but grew comparatively slowly.
46 The probability that the guidelines in the six states where commissions were directed
are the six guidelines significantly associated with reduced prison population growth is two
in one thousand (one half to the ninth power).
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actually cause prison population growth to moderate. First, there is
no assurance that guideline framers actually follow mandates to con-
sider prison capacity. This is illustrated by the federal guideline expe-
rience. Congress told the Federal Sentencing Commission to take
prison capacity into account,47 but the Commission members disre-
garded this in their desire to stiffen sentences.48 Thus, it is possible
for sentencing commissions to ignore legislative directives to take
prison capacity into account, although that apparently did not hap-
pen in the five states with such directives stiidied here.
Second, the causal direction is not altogether clear. Perhaps the
guidelines were prompted by an unusual jump in prison population,
and the apparent impacts in Table 1 might be only a return to histori-
cal trends. That is, the moderation of growth might simply be a re-
turn to normal levels that would have occurred without the
guidelines. This is not likely, however, for two reasons: First, the ma-
jor rationale for sentencing guidelines was to reduce sentencing dis-
parity, and prison population problems were secondary concerns.49
Second, the prison population data do not evidence unusual spurts
before the sentencing commissions were created in any state, as is
seen in Table 2, which presents the prison population growth rates of
the guideline states in relation to nationwide trends.50
The third and most important caution is that the results in Table
I show only that something happened in six states to moderate prison
population growth after the guidelines went into effect. The state may
have developed other programs (not accounted for in the regression
analysis) causing prison growth to moderate with or without the
guidelines. Wisconsin is a possible example. Soon after Wisconsin im-
plemented its guidelines, the state developed a series of intensive su-
pervision programs, under which non-violent offenders who would
ordinarily go to prison were instead placed in jail or placed under
tighter supervision than the state gives to regular probationers and
parolees.5 1
It is likely that state policy makers decided that moderation was
necessary, and the guidelines are only one aspect of that decision,
47 Congress stated that the "sentencing guidelines... shall be formulated to minimize
the likelihood that the Federal prison population will exceed the capacity of the Federal
prisons, as determined by the Commission." 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1993).
48 Von Hirsch & Green, supra note 23, at 334-36, 341; Alschuler, supra note 3, at 936.
49 Oregon is a possible exception. See supra note 15.
50 See Table 2, infra, at Appendix A.
51 The Wisconsin Department of Corrections developed several programs starting in
1987. Then the legislature established a broad program of intensive supervision for de-
fendants sentenced afterJune 1992. PatrickJ. Fiedler, Intensive Sanctions, a New Sentendng
Option, 65 Wis. L. REv. 15, 15 (June 1992); seeWis. STAT. §§ 301.048,973.032 (Supp. 1994).
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along with such actions as limiting appropriations for prison construc-
tion. In Florida, for example, there is evidence that prison population
growth was not reduced by the guidelines, but by legislators' reluc-
tance to fund more prisons and the resulting need to adopt early re-
lease programs to keep prison population within capacity limits. 52 In
fact, the Florida legislature rejected some sentence increases pro-
posed by the sentencing commission. 53
It is possible to distinguish the impact of guidelines from broader
policies by examining the time gap between the creation of the sen-
tencing commissions and the effective date of the guidelines. If
guidelines are only manifestations of, and relatively unimportant parts
of, a general policy to limit prison growth, then the policy originated
at least as early as the legislation that directed the commissions to con-
sider prison capacity. As Table 2 indicates, the time gap was one year
in Florida, two years in Minnesota and Oregon, and three years in
Washington and Tennessee. Also, the practical effect of the time gap
is one year more for the first four states because the laws were only
effective for crimes committed after the effective dates. 54 If the mod-
eration of prison growth results mainly from an overall policy deci-
sion, the moderation should start well before the law went into effect.
Thus, this study conducted a regression similar to that in Table 1, ex-
cept that the guideline variables were scored as one starting when leg-
islatures created sentencing commissions. These dummy variables are
not significant for Delaware, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington,
suggesting that the guidelines themselves moderated prison growth. 55
However, they are significant for Florida, Tennessee, or Wisconsin,
suggesting that much of the moderation came from other actions
taken by the state to limit prison growth.56
52 William D. Bales & Linda G. Dees, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing in Florida: Past
Trends and Future Implications, 38 CRIME & DEUINQ. 309, 313 (1992); Holten & Handberg,
supra note 23, at 267.
53 Holten & Handberg, supra note 23, at 265.
54 See supra text accompanying notes 35 to 36.
55 The coefficients and T-Ratios for variables representing the original law are: Dela-
ware, -.13, 1.48; Florida, -.25, 6.76; Minnesota, -.06, .53; Oregon, .06, .97; Pennsylvania, -.01,
.26; Tennessee, -.23, 6.41; Washington, .06, .88; Wisconsin, -.09, 2.21. Otherwise the results
are similar to those in Table 1, first and second columns.
56 Another way to control for a general policy limiting prison growth is to control for
the overall rate of prison population growth in each state. The prison population regres-
sion in Table 1 was conducted with an additional 50 trend variables. For each state this is a
(logged) counter for the state and zero for all other states. The results are similar to those
in Table 1 for the Minnesota and Washington guidelines. The Oregon guidelines have a
nearly significant coefficient, but for the others the guidelines are positive or are far from
significant. The coefficients and T-Ratios for the guideline variables are: Delaware, -.10,
.87; Florida, -.04, .64; Michigan, -.03, .59; Minnesota, -.24, 4.14; Oregon, -.11, 1.75; Penn-
sylvania, .10, 1.85; Tennessee, -.14, .67; Washington, -.25, 3.24; Wisconsin, .00, .05. The
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V1. CONCLUSION
Sentencing guidelines are strongly associated with comparatively
slow prison population growth whenever the legislature charged the
sentencing commission to consider prison capacity when establishing
presumptive sentence ranges. This association, however, does not
necessarily imply causation, and the slowdown in some states may have
resulted from broad efforts to reduce prison population growth,
rather than solely from the guidelines.
These findings are a refreshing departure from the usual nega-
tive results when evaluating criminal justice reforms. Also, the bulk of
research elsewhere suggests that judges generally adhere to presump-
tive guidelines and that the guidelines reduce sentencing disparity.57
Sentencing guideline laws, thus, run counter to the current senti-
ment58 that little in the criminal justice system works as intended.
additional 50 variables might create collinearity problems, causing the impacts to be
underestimated.
57 See, e.g., Terance D. Miethe & Charles A. Moore, Sentencing Guidelines: Their Effect in
Minnesota, NATIONAL INST. opJusr. RES. IN BRIEF, passim (April 1989); Tonry, supra note 34,
at 59-75. But see Alschuler, supra note 3, passim Savelsberg, supra note 25, passim.
58 See, e.g., MALcoLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL,
passim (1983).
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Table 1





Delaware (10-10-87) -.17 2.20* -.22 1.82
Florida (10-1-83)# -.23 5.23** .08 .67
Michigan (3-1-84) .02 .33 .02 .13
Minnesota (5-1-80)# -.35 6.11** -.11 1.33
Oregon (11-1-89)# -.13 2.03* -.22 1.86
Pennsylvania (7-22-82)# .14 3.52** .02 .20
Tennessee (11-1-89) -.21 3.68** - -
Washington (7-1-84)# -.33 6.81"* .09 .59
Wisconsin (11-1-85) -.09 1.84 -.03 .23
Major crime rate# - - .26 3.52**
Percent pop. 18-24 .06 .42 -.22 .86
Percent pop. 25-34 .66 3.82** 2.16 6.58**
Personal income# .08 .55 -.29 1.08
Employment rate# -.22 1.08 .67 1.79
Variable Group F Values
Sentencing law dummies 15.73** 1.17
Year dummies 42.46** 10.24**
State dummies 63.39** 38.63**
Sample Size 842 823
Adjusted R-square .99 .99
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.66 1.86
# - The variable is lagged one year.
* - Significant to the .05 level; ** to the .001 level.
The two columns below each dependent variable are the coefficients and absolute values of T
Ratios. The time covered, excluding one year lost in the autocorrelation correction, are 1977-
1993 for prison population and 1975-1993 for commitments. The dates in parentheses are the
effective dates of the guidelines. The dependent variables and the continuous control variables
are logged per capita variables.
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Table 2
PRISON POPULATION CHANGE IN GUIDELINE STATES RELATIVE TO
NATIONWIDE TRENDS
U.S. Del. Fla. Mich. Minn. Or. Pa. Tenn. Wash. Wis.
1976 11.5 6.0 4.7 3.4 -15.1 2.3 -0.2 -5.9 0.4 -1.2
1977 10.8 9.1 -1.6 0.1 5.1 -7.8 1.3 3.0 -0.5 -9.3
1978 3.4 19.2 5.9 4.7 0.4# -4.6 0.1# 3.1 4.5 -0.9
1979 5.6 2.7 -14.2 -5.2 1.6 4.7 -6.1 8.0 -8.8 1.5
1980 6.5 -6.6 -2.4 -5.7 -10.9* -6.4 -0.9 -0.6 -5.2 1.7
1981 13.8 1.0 1.0 -13.6 -15.5 -10.0 0.7 -1.3 7.5# -3.6
1982 12.8 8.4 4.2# -14.4 -7.0 5.7 -0.3* -13.2 4.6 -5.3
1983 7.4 -3.0 -13.8* -10.1 -5.9 -6.1 4.6 10.8 -1.1 -4.6#
1984 6.6 -8.7# -1.2 -6.0* -4.0 0.3 4.5 -12.0 -4.2* -3.9
1985 8.5 5.3 -2.1 13.1 -0.4 -4.9 0.1 -20.4 -7.1 0.0*
1986 7.0 4.2 6.2 9.8 -1.9 2.0 0.4 6.4# -11.6 -1.0
1987 6.2 4.2* -5.8 8.9 -2.8 8.2# 0.9 -1.0 -13.3 1.0
1988 7.0 -4.8 0.2 8.6 2.9 2.8 3.1 0.6 -12.1 -3.8
1989 12.1 -8.6 3.1 2.5 -1.2 -9.3* 2.3 -5.3* 7.0 -5.0
1990 7.1 -9.0 3.9 1.2 -4.7 -1.6 1.8 -9.4 8.3 2.7
1991 6.8 3.6 -2.0 -0.5 2.5 -3.1 -1.8 3.7 7.7 -2.3
1992 5.6 3.8 -1.8 1.8 4.5 -7.8 1.2 -2.3 3.2 -2.8
1993 5.4 -2.6 4.1 -4.9 4.5 -5.8 -1.1 2.8 -0.8 0.0
The U.S. column is the average (mean) of the state percent changes in the year. The state
columns are the percent change in prison population less the nationwide average change. The
prison population is prisoners sentenced for more than a year. The 1993 data are preliminary.
# - The year of legislation creating the sentencing commission (there was no such legislation in
Michigan).
* - The year when sentencing guidelines went into effect. See the text at note 5, supra.
